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Abstract: Evictions, perhaps more than other civil remedies for controlling
crime and disorder in public housing, have seized the attention of policy
makers and housing directors during the 1990s. Nonetheless, public
housing authorities have been slow to enforce the federal "one strike"
policy, which grants site managers the authority to evict suspected offend-
ers after an administrative hearing, without having to wait for a criminal
conviction. This paper examines the effects of criminal and lease-violating
behavior on evictions among residents living in six public housing devel-
opments in Jersey City, NJ after controlling for family characteristics. We
examine, first, the structural and violation characteristics of a sample of
households evicted in 1994 and 1995; second, whether evicted house-
holds differ significantly on various social dimensions using a random
sample of households taken from the same population; and third, the
relative importance of family, economic and lease-violating factors in
predicting whether an eviction will result. The implications, based on a
logistic regression model, point to the discretionary use of administrative
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and policy violation notices as a promising tool for dealing with problem
apartments in public housing communities.
INTRODUCTION
For many years, public housing developments across the U.S. have
served as testing grounds for a broad range of crime prevention strate-
gies. Early research efforts, most notably by Oscar Newman, found that
accessibility and physical layout were key determinants of crime, fear
and transience in urban housing populations (Newman, 1973; Newman
and Franck, 1980). Newman and his colleagues subsequently advocated
changes to the design of public housing to create "defensible space."
Rainwater (1970) found that residents of the Pruitt-Igoe housing devel-
opment in St. Louis felt endangered and socially isolated because of the
poor security and extreme disrepair of their surroundings. These find-
ings spawned extensive efforts to clean up the physical appearances of
public housing sites, and highlighted the importance of social programs
for public housing residents.
In recent years, many local police departments and public housing
police agencies have taken a problem-solving approach to control crime
and disorder problems in public housing sites (see Dunworth and
Saiger, 1994; Giacomazzi et al., 1995; Mazerolle and Terrill, 1997;
Weisel, 1990). Problem-oriented policing typically extends the responsi-
bility for crime control beyond the police and relies on third parties such
as property owners, citizen groups and municipal agencies, to solve
crime and disorder problems (see Buerger and Mazerolle, 1998; Eck and
Spelman, 1987; Goldstein, 1990). In addition to collaboration, the
problem-solving approach requires police departments and partnership
agencies to develop an understanding of how criminal incidents form
patterns across targeted areas so that this knowledge can be used to
implement long-term solutions.
Since traditional policing activities involve mostly arrests and prose-
cution, it is easy to forget that the police and municipal agencies can
initiate a number of other legal actions to deal with recurring problems
in public housing. For example, problem-solving programs can make
use of city licensing, zoning laws, forfeitures, tenant lease policies and
other civil remedies to gain compliance from residents and outsiders
who are responsible for creating, or exacerbating, problems (see Gold-
stein, 1990). Problem-solving teams, working in selected housing devel-
opments of Philadelphia and Jersey City, for instance, have aggressively
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enforced health codes and city ordinances to alleviate drugs and inci-
vilities (Weisel, 1990; Mazerolle and Terrill, 1997). Anti-drug efforts
initiated by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) have also relied on civil measures, such as leasehold forfeitures
and restraining orders, to solve public nuisance and drug problems
(Popkin et al., 1995; Weisel, 1990).
The proliferation of alternatives to traditional policing methods is
largely representative of a paradigm shift in policing that assumes that
the police cannot effectively deal with crime on their own (see also
Skogan and Annan, 1994). It is within this context that we examine the
factors that influence eviction decisions in six public housing develop-
ments in Jersey City, NJ. We begin our paper with a summary of the
legal basis for evicting public housing residents. We then discuss our
research methods and data and conclude with a discussion of the role
of evictions as an alternative means to resolve problems in public
housing sites.
LEGAL BASIS TO EVICT RESIDENTS FROM PUBLIC
HOUSING
Evictions, perhaps more than other civil remedies, have seized the
attention of policy makers and public housing directors during the
1990s. Many commentators suggest that the legal authority to evict a
resident who sells narcotics out of his or her apartment can provide an
effective response to problems in public housing sites. The Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-690) explicitly states that criminal
activity, including drug use, is cause for termination of tenancy. None-
theless, housing authorities have been slow to enforce this policy, partly
because of the tedious administrative hearings that accompany evic-
tions for misconduct. In addition, site managers are not always able to
obtain reliable information that will stand up in court, and, in some
cases, they do not realize the scope of their legal authority. This is
understandable, considering the vague guidelines that HUD provides for
implementing drug-related evictions: "The decision whether to initiate
proceedings to terminate tenancy in a particular case remains a matter
of good judgement by the Public Housing Authority (PHA) based on the
factual situation" (Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988).
Under the guidance of the federal "one strike" policy, and in accor-
dance with the Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996,
public housing managers have recently been given the authority to evict
suspected offenders after an administrative hearing, without having to
wait for a criminal conviction. Police officers and resident leaders may
310 — Justin Ready et al.
provide arrest reports and personal testimony during the tenancy
hearings. The lease amendment specifies that proof of criminal activity
by a "preponderance of evidence" is sufficient to establish that there has
been a violation. Housing directors largely support the new policy,
which could potentially streamline a process that often takes years to
complete (Cazenave, 1990). At the same time, many feel that the new
policy fails to address a number of real-world issues. Specifically, local
courts have been reluctant to fully embrace zero-tolerance eviction
programs as a method of crime control. Judges acknowledge that public
housing is a last resort for severely disadvantaged households with
special difficulties locating adequate, affordable housing in the private
market, particularly families experiencing single parenthood, discrimi-
nation and long-term poverty (President's Commission on Housing,
1982; see also Holzman, 1996). Indeed, the crime-reducing benefits
gained by evicting a tenant must be measured against the considerable
human and monetary costs of homelessness that may result (Weil,
1991).
To date, few criminologists have empirically examined the use of
evictions to control crime in public housing, or the characteristics of
households evicted for lease-violating behavior. Studies that incorporate
measures of evictions usually rely on anecdotal information provided by
housing authorities, much of which is reported in case studies and
interviews with local officials (Dunworth and Saiger, 1993). For example,
Harold Lucas, executive director of the Newark Housing Authority,
reported 20 eviction cases resulting from criminal activity from 1992
through 1995 (Sunday Star-Ledger, 1996). The Jersey City Housing
Authority (JCHA), the second largest of New Jersey's 81 agencies,
chronicled only six criminal tenancy cases that led to evictions in 1995.
These low numbers illustrate that crime- and drug-related evictions are
relatively uncommon, despite the fact that over 900 felony arrests are
made in both Jersey City and Newark housing developments annually
(Center for Crime Prevention Studies, 1995).
This paper examines the effects of criminal and lease-violating be-
havior on evictions among residents living in six public housing devel-
opments in Jersey City, NJ after controlling for economic and family
characteristics. We examine, first, the structural and violation charac-
teristics of a sample of households evicted in 1994 and 1995; second,
whether evicted households differ significantly on various social dimen-
sions from a random sample of households taken from the same popu-
lation; and, third, the relative importance of family, economic and lease-
violating factors in predicting whether an eviction will result. We are
particularly interested in examining the relative influences of criminal
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violations compared to rent delinquency and other non-criminal viola-
tions in determining a manager's use of the civil law to deal with prob-
lem households.
Public Housing Residents of Jersey City
Jersey City resembles other densely populated, industrial cities in
the northeast U.S. Located in the New York City metropolitan area,
Jersey City sustains concentrated areas of low-income housing, jobless-
ness and crime. Three out of ten Jersey City residents are foreign born
— a higher proportion than is found in any other metropolis except
Miami, FL. Encompassing 41% of the population of Hudson County, the
city is best characterized as a blue-collar, urban center. The 1990
census shows an overall unemployment rate of 11%, and indicates that
18% of the total population (229,000) and 35% of all female-headed
households live in poverty. A substantial number of these impoverished
families reside in the 11 public housing developments managed by the
JCHA.
Rates of violent crime and disorder are generally higher in other
public housing than other inner-city locations. Comparative research
using census tract and block-level data shows that, after controlling for
economic and housing characteristics, public housing generates more
index crimes of all types (Brill and Associates, 1977; Roncek, et al.,
1981). Dunworth and Saiger (1993) found that housing developments
in Phoenix, AZ; Los Angeles, CA; and Washington D.C. produced signifi-
cantly higher levels of violent and drug-related activity compared to city-
wide and nearby neighborhood crime rates. Consistent with past re-
search, public housing in Jersey City has been designated a "High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area," pursuant to Section 1005 of the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988.
Weisburd and Green (1995) used mapping software to plot arrest
and criminal investigation data against street addresses, and found that
six public housing developments in Jersey City ranked among the top
ten drug market and violent crime locations in the city. Drawing from
a citywide analysis of narcotics and violent crime data, six developments
emerged as experiencing severe and persistent crime problems: Duncan
Apartments, Curries Woods Apartments, Montgomery Gardens,
Lafayette Gardens, Booker T. Apartments and Marion Gardens (Weis-
burd and Green, 1995).
Table 1 profiles the six public housing developments included in this
study. Each development was built during the 1950s and houses be-
tween 243 and 649 families.1 Overall, the housing developments com-
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prise a total of 2,640 discrete units. The percentage of elderly house-
holds ranges from 5% in one study site (Duncan Apartments) to 22% in
another (Booker T. Apartments), with most sites falling well below the
city (25%) and national (35%) averages (Holzman, 1996).2 Approximately
one-third of all leaseholders living within the six public housing sites
works at least part-time, while 37% receive Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC).
Table 1: Profile of Targeted Public Housing
Developments in Jersey City, NJ
PUBLIC HOUSING LEASE RECORDS AND STUDY
METHODS
Measuring the criminal and lease-violating conduct of public hous-
ing residents is a menacing task. Police department records are impre-
cise because they are affected by variations in citizen reporting and
police deployment across neighborhoods (Dunworth and Saiger, 1993;
Eck and Spelman, 1987). Although official data sources comprise de-
tailed information on offense types and locations, they do not keep
household-level information on public housing populations. Since this
paper examines both criminal and noncriminal behavior, and circum-
stances that influence a manager's decision to evict a household, back-
ground factors that are not routinely collected through police reports
must be incorporated as control variables. Furthermore, since many
incidents that are known to and recorded by the police are never
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brought to the attention of housing officials (thus cannot be considered
during the decision-making process that precedes tenancy hearings), it
makes methodological sense to use data that are internal to public
housing authorities, preferably data upon which tenancy decisions are
based.
As part of HUD's record-keeping system, housing authorities are re-
quired to maintain a lease file on each household. In addition to pro-
viding a unit-by-unit list of addresses within each site, the files include
details on lease violations and the circumstances surrounding each
event. The JCHA's data files are supplemented with arrest reports,
treatment referrals and narratives furnished by police officers and social
service providers. The exact procedure followed by individual agencies
in documenting lease data varies, depending on the size and adminis-
trative style of the PHA (Holzman, 1996). In general, agencies update
household records yearly and register violations with written "notices to
cease" or "notices of nonpayment," depending on the nature of the
infraction.
Lease records from 352 households across six public housing devel-
opments were examined in the spring of 1996. The sampling procedure
involved the selection of two distinct samples. The first included lease
records from 85 households that were evicted in 1994 and 1995. With
the exception of three files that were either missing or being used in
court, field researchers retrieved archival data on all leases terminated
within the study period.3 The second sample included lease records for
267 randomly selected non-evicted households, stratified by housing
development.4 For analytic purposes, a probability sample was used
approximating household characteristics (i.e., employment status,
number of minors, age of leaseholder) of the larger public housing
communities. In total, we examined the lease records for 352 public
housing households in Jersey City.
Study Variables
The dependent variable used in this study was the eviction status of
each household, measured as "evicted" or "not evicted." The variable of
eviction, then, is a dichotomous variable: households that were not
evicted in either 1994 or 1995 received a score of zero, while those that
were evicted received a score of 1. A total of 88 households were evicted
during the study period.
The stated cause for eviction in most cases was habitual non-
payment of rent. The tenant lease agreement stipulates that legal action
for non-payment may be instituted one month after a second written
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notice is issued (one notice is mailed out after each month a leaseholder
fails to pay rent), allowing managers wide discretion in deciding when
to initiate proceedings. Indeed, the average number of non-payment
notices issued to non-evicted households was 2.9, more than the mini-
mum requirement for legal action, suggesting that legal action is largely
a function of a manager's control over the eviction process. As Keyes
(1992) explains: "Many managers use nonpayment as a means of getting
an eviction for what is actually a drug situation. When managers should
go for a drug-related eviction and when they should go for nonpayment
is a critical strategy decision, because the courts will not allow the
conversion of one tactic to the other" (p. 182). Since New Jersey state law
prevents PHAs from displacing juvenile offenders and residents who are
in court-ordered drug treatment programs, eviction for non-payment
may be seen as a tool for getting around legal obstacles.
The effects of criminal and lease-violating activity on evictions are
examined using three primary independent variables: criminal lease
violations, noncriminal policy violations and administrative complaints.
These are interval-level variables indicating the number of violations of
a specific type incurred by a household in 1994 and 1995. Since habit-
ual non-payment of rent is the expressed cause for termination in most
cases, high numbers of non-payment notices are naturally expected to
increase the probability of eviction. However, we hypothesize that the
presence of other forms of lease-violating behavior, particularly criminal
activity, will increase the odds of eviction to a greater degree than non-
payment. Violations unrelated to payment history, serving as latent
predictors of eviction, are suspected to be an underlying cause for legal
action in many situations, whereas rent-based proceedings mask their
influence. This hypothesis will be tested statistically in the ensuing
analysis by examining the odds ratios for latent predictors, which reflect
the average change in the probability of eviction for every additional
lease violation, holding all other independent variables constant.
Table 2 displays the composition of the three types of lease violations
examined in this study. The first category of lease violations comprises
crimes reported to and cleared by the police and later recorded by
managers as household violations involving illegal activity. Over three-
fourths of these criminal violations were recorded directly from arrest
reports provided by Jersey City public housing officers. Assaults, drug-
related crimes and disputes between intimates account for more than
half of all arrests that eventually result in written violation notices. The
second category of lease violations includes infractions that violate
public housing policy, but that are generally less serious in nature and
do not involve a criminal justice system response. Most of the infrac-
Getting Evicted from Public Housing — 315
tions in this category are social incivilities related to household cleaning
habits, everyday interactions with neighbors and treatment of the
premises. The third and last category of lease violations includes ad-
ministrative complaints issued when a leaseholder habitually fails to file
occupancy forms, attend meetings or follow procedures set forth by the
management.
Table 2: Categories of Public Housing Lease Violations
Housing authorities are required to issue a preliminary notice to
cease for any of these activities if they threaten the health, safety or
right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises of other residents. It is only
when such noncriminal activities continue that a manager has a cause
for eviction.
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Six control variables were included in the analysis, representing the
structural and financial characteristics of the individual households in
the study sample: (1) the age of the leaseholder; (2) the number of
minors in the family; (3) one-adult household (yes/no); (4) the number
of years living in public housing; (5) the monthly rent (dollars amount);
and (6) the number of non-payment-of-rent slips issued. One-adult
household is a binary variable indicating whether a household has one
or more adult family members (18 years or older) on the lease. This
measure should be interpreted with caution because of the regularity
of adult males living "off the record" with a spouse or relatives. Like the
violation types shown in 2, non-payment of rent slips issued is a con-
tinuous variable denoting the number of rent violations a household
accumulated in 1994 and 1995, with 24 being the maximum number
of issuances possible. In sum, the household variables selected here are
moderately correlated with violation types (see Appendix), and, accord-
ing to interviews with the site managers (n=6), are reasonably well-
established factors influencing PHA decisions regarding eviction pro-
ceedings.
RESEARCH RESULTS
The analytic strategy used in this study involves a number of statis-
tical tests. First, the average numbers of infractions committed by
evicted and non-evicted households are compared. Second, using inde-
pendent sample t-tests, the differences in family characteristics between
the two samples are examined. Finally, a multiple logistic regression
model is used to control for the effects of the household structural
characteristics, allowing for an examination of the isolated effects of
violation types on public housing evictions. Table 3 compares the char-
acteristics of evicted and non-evicted households from the six public
housing developments.
Table 3 presents eviction and non-eviction group percentages that
reveal several noteworthy differences in earning potential and violation
characteristics. A substantially higher percentage of non-evicted house-
holds (38%) than evicted households (24%) reported at least part-time
employment in 1994 and 1995. Twenty percent more of the evicted
households than the non-evicted households received AFDC or general
assistance as their main source of income. The gap in earning potential
is magnified after taking into account the proportion of working-age
leaseholders in each of the samples: nearly 20% of non-evicted lease-
holders were retired and receiving social security or pension benefits
compared to just 6% of leaseholders in the eviction group. The higher
Getting Evicted from Public Housing — 317
percentage of rent violations incurred by evicted households than non-
evicted households, shown at the bottom of Table 3, may be the result
of different employment circumstances.
Table 3: Characteristics of Evicted and Non-Evicted
Households from Public Housing Developments in
Jersey City, NJ (1994-95)
Table 3 also indicates that more than twice as many evicted house-
holds than non-evicted households incurred one or more drug-related
violations, even though the eviction sample is much smaller than the
non-evicted sample. Measuring the extent to which drug and alcohol
addiction precipitates rent delinquency is not the focus here, but it is
reasonable to speculate that long-term addiction detracts from a resi-
dent's ability to make payments on time and comply with management
policies.
A striking result presented in Table 3 shows that over half (52%) of
those evicted from public housing incurred one or more violation notices
for illegal activity in their last two years of residence, compared with
12% of households in the non-evicted sample. Only a handful of the
active lease files (4%) contained more than one violation resulting in
arrest, while 15% of the terminated files produced a string of three or
more criminal violations. Family composition factors remained relatively
stable across these groups. Female leaseholders were predominant in
both samples. Just under half of the households contained one adult
family member, and, on average, three residents occupied each of the
units.
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While Table 3 illustrates important differences between the evicted
and non-evicted samples, statistical tests of the differences in family
characteristics between the two samples are provided in Table 4.
Table 4: Independent Sample t-tests for Evicted and
Non-Evicted Public Housing Households in Jersey City,
NJ (1994-95)
As Table 4 shows, the evicted households and non-evicted house-
holds are significantly different across a number of family and violation
characteristics. Evicted household leaseholders tend to be younger (40.6
years) than non-evicted leaseholders (46.7 years); evicted households
have significantly more children in their care (1.8 children) than non-
evicted households (1.3 children); evicted households have lived in
public housing for a shorter time (12 years) than their non-evicted
counterparts (16.9 years); evicted households pay significantly less
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monthly rent ($197) than the non-evicted households ($241); and
evicted households have far more lease violations (3.3) than non-evicted
households (0.6).
Table 5 below presents the results from a multiple logistic regression
model that is used to control for the effects of household structural
characteristics, in order to examine the isolated effects of violation types
on whether a household is likely to be evicted or not.5 The odds ratios
and p-values for predictor variables are presented in Table 5. In general,
the coefficient Pi in the logistic model estimates the average change in
the log-odds of eviction when Xi is increased by one unit, holding all
other independent variables fixed. The antilog of the coefficient, ep, then
estimates the odds ratio
Table 5 shows that for each additional criminal violation incurred by
a public housing household in this study, the odds of eviction increase
by 51%.6 Administrative complaints show a stronger effect than other
violation types, increasing the likelihood of eviction by 68% for each
infraction. Policy violations are also a significant predictor of whether or
not a household is evicted (p=.O35): for each additional policy violation,
the odds of eviction increase by 41%.
Socioeconomic factors were quite limited in their predictive power of
whether or not a household was evicted. Important exceptions were
years as resident and monthly rent, both of which showed small, inverse
effects. That is, as the number of years living in public housing and the
monthly rent payments increase, the probability of eviction decreases.
Interestingly, non-payment slips issued was not significant at the p
< .05 level when criminal violations and, in particular, administrative
complaints were added to the model. This finding suggests that non-
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Table 5: Multiple Logistic Regression Model Predicting
for Public Housing Evictions in Jersey City, NJ
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper explored the factors that contribute to families being
evicted from public housing. In particular, we examined the structural
and violation characteristics of a sample of households evicted in 1994
and 1995, whether evicted households differed from non-evicted house-
holds on various social dimensions, and the importance of family,
economic, and lease-violating factors in predicting whether or not a
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household would be evicted. We were particularly interested in examin-
ing the relative influences of criminal violations compared to rent delin-
quency and other non-criminal violations in determining a manager's
use of the civil law to deal with problem households. We began our
paper by hypothesizing that the presence of lease-violating behavior,
particularly criminal activity, would increase the odds of eviction to a
greater degree than non-payment of rent. We also suspected that viola-
tions unrelated to payment history, serving as latent predictors of
eviction, would be an underlying cause for legal action in many situa-
tions.
The results indicate that non-payment of rent plays a smaller role in
eviction decisionmaking than once expected. After statistically control-
ling for noncriminal policy violations and household characteristics,
rent delinquency failed to predict the occurrence of public housing
evictions at the .05 level of significance. Moreover, although arrests are
an important factor that managers considered in eviction hearings,
administrative complaints (violations for behaviors that are unrelated
to criminal activity or non-payment of rent) are the most important
predictor of whether or not a household is evicted. Administrative
complaints are recorded as "notices to cease" and are typically used by
public housing managers for "lack of behavior" rather than for involve-
ment in illegal activities or delinquent rent payments. For example,
when residents are perceived by public housing administrators as being
uncooperative — when they refuse to file or deliberately lie on occu-
pancy forms, or when they fail to attend inspections and tenancy meet-
ings — then a "notice to cease" may be issued. Site managers have
considerable discretion in issuing "notices to cease," and many observ-
ers comment that the administrative complaint mechanism, and to a
lesser degree policy violations, provide site managers with a capacity to
build a case against residents who they see as being troublesome.
Within the broader context of civil remedies, notices to cease appear
to be an important and direct tool used by site managers to control the
activities of public housing residents. The vagueness of an "administra-
tive complaint" allows site managers wide discretion in their decision to
invoke this particular type of civil remedy in a range of different situa-
tions. On one hand, administrative and policy violation notices are
social control tools that give site managers the means for controlling the
behavior of law-abiding public housing residents. This type of civil
remedy is inappropriate if site managers overuse administrative com-
plaints and violations, or use them to unfairly target particular public
housing residents. On the other hand, the administrative complaint and
policy violation options provide managers with a method for systemati-
322 — Justin Ready et al.
cally targeting criminally active public housing residents who pay their
rent on time and avoid arrest. In these situations, public housing man-
agers can use the administrative and policy violation mechanisms as a
means to initiate eviction proceedings and deal with persistent problems
in public housing settings.
The key to fair play in the use of administrative and policy violations
in the public housing eviction process appears to be in controlling the
unfettered discretionary use of a tool that has the potential for abuse.
This is a specific challenge that is reflective of a broader challenge in the
general use of civil remedies for crime control purposes. Given that a
household that has been evicted from public housing is no longer
eligible for federally subsidized housing, we suggest that the discretion-
ary use of administrative complaints and policy violation notices as a
strategy to control the misconduct of public housing residents should
be carefully monitored, and guidelines be developed to eliminate dis-
parities in eviction decision-making processes. One direction PHAs
could take is to standardize the eviction process, whereby households
would incur a varying number of points for administrative, policy and
rent violations. Public housing directors could set an annual point
threshold, at which point an eviction hearing may be scheduled. Such
guidelines would regulate site managers' discretion over the eviction
process, at the same time allowing them to use a widely accessible civil
remedy for controlling crime and incivilities in public housing commu-
nities across the U.S.
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NOTES
1. Many households have second generation families (e.g., a mother,
daughter and daughter's children) living in the same unit. Variations in
how extended families are grouped account for the discrepancy between the
number of families residing in the six housing developments and the num-
ber of units reported in Table 1.
2. Elderly households include a primary leaseholder who is 62 years or
older.
3. Records were designated "skipouts" when a family violated the lease
agreement (usually through non-payment of rent), then moved from the
housing development before eviction proceedings could run their course.
Because this paper is only concerned with lockouts, and because it is
impossible to determine which skipouts would have resulted in evictions
had the families remained in public housing, these records were excluded
from the sample.
4. Originally, 50 occupied units were randomly selected from each of the
developments, totaling 300 households. Because JCHA lease records are
not computerized and frequently change offices (i.e., management office,
legal office), 33 records could not be coded. Background checks were made
here to ensure that bias was not introduced into the sample.
5. The logistic analysis was built from the ground up by running a series of
independent sample t-tests on household variables, then placing key
predictors in the final model based on whether or not mean sample values
differed significantly at the p < .01 level. Contextual information gathered
during management interviews aided the selection process. Nine predictors
were obtained, most of which are listed in Table 4 along with their respec-
tive t-values. Each independent variable was regressed on the remaining
ones to test for multicollinearity; consequently, total lease violations and
family size were discarded. One adult household was added to obtain a
rough measure of the impact of adult guardianship on the odds of eviction.
6. The reasoning behind the model specified in Table 4 and the methods
that guided this specification, are exploratory and not capable of ruling out
alternative models for estimating PHA lockouts. Many factors retained here
yield significant parameter estimates and the model chi-square test indi-
cates that the data fit the model. But it is important to note that the tenant
population and bureaucratic style of the JCHA are unique from those of
other PHAs. Samples from high-crime developments in Jersey City, for
example, may be disproportionately composed of tenants who have higher
vulnerability to arrest, higher levels of nonpayment stemming from eco-
Getting Evicted from Public Housing — 327
nomic hardship or more violation notices because of less tolerant manage-
ment policies. These regional circumstances warrant caution in the gener-
alizations that can be drawn.
